Information Reduction as item-general strategy change by Gaschler, Robert
  
Information Reduction as Item-general 
Strategy Change 
DISSERTATION
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades doctor rerum naturalium
(Dr. rer. nat.) im Fach Psychologie
eingereicht an der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II
der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
von Dipl.-Psych. Robert Gaschler
geboren am 29.09.1978 in Neubrandenburg
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Christoph Markschies
Dekan der Mathematisch Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät II: Prof. Dr. Peter A. Frensch
Gutachter/innen:
Prof. Dr. Hilde Haider, Universität Köln
Prof. Dr. Gesine Dreisbach, Universität Bielefeld
Prof. Dr. Peter A. Frensch, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Tag der Verteidigung: 30.06.2009








Predictions of Item-specific and Item-general Perspectives ......................................10
Results..................................................................................................................................11
Manipulation check – Representation strength was successfully varied....................11
Reduction of the string length effect over blocks (1)..................................................11
Equal rates of transfer errors for strings of different frequencies (2)..........................13
Equal fixations to the irrelevant letters for strings with different frequencies (3)......13
Time course – abruptly and at the same point in time for all strings (4)....................14
Item-general Information Reduction at the cost of errors (5).....................................14
Summary and Discussion.....................................................................................................16
Conclusions based on work in the included publications ..........................................16
Broadening the Perspective on Strategy Change........................................................17
Item-general learning of the triplets..................................................................17
Data-driven and yet item-general?.....................................................................20
Studying Information Reduction after it happened outside the lab?.................22
Voluntary vs. involuntary performance changes...............................................22
Conclusion............................................................................................................................24
References ...........................................................................................................................25
Erklärung zum Zustandekommen der Arbeit........................................................................33
1Abstract
Practice not only affects how but also which information is processed. Past research on 
Information Reduction (Haider & Frensch, 1996) has underscored the importance of the latter aspect 
for cognitive skill acquisition. Information Reduction applies in situations in which tasks contain 
both relevant and irrelevant information, and denotes a change from a strategy involving processing 
all elements of a task to a processing-relevant-elements-only strategy. On the one hand, it has been 
repeatedly observed in a broad range of contexts (e.g., human-machine interaction, educational and 
sports psychology) that people tend to ignore irrelevant information after repeated exposure. On the 
other hand, both from the perspective of theories on skill acquisition and for practical concerns, it is 
not sufficiently understood how Information Reduction takes place and which factors foster or 
impede it. In the research presented here, participants had the task to verify whether or not 
alphanumeric strings followed the alphabetical order. These strings were a compound of two parts, 
one of which was always correct and thus effectively irrelevant. As the different strings were 
repeated at different rates per practice block, it could be tested whether people learn to ignore 
irrelevant aspects of a task string by string or rather once and  for all strings. Information Reduction 
was item-general rather than item-specific. The data are inconsistent with the view that strategy 
change in general, and Information Reduction in particular, is exclusively based on item-specific 
data-driven learning processes, bare of the involvement of a voluntary decision. Rather, RTs, 
fixations, and transfer errors indicated that strategy change entails top-down modulation.
Keywords: Information Reduction, skill acquisition, strategy change, voluntary control
2Zusammenfassung
Übung beeinflusst nicht nur wie sondern auch welche Information verarbeitet wird. Die 
bisherige Forschung zur Informationsreduktion (Haider & Frensch, 1996) hat die Wichtigkeit des 
letzteren Aspektes für den kognitiven Fertigkeitserwerb herausgearbeitet. Informationsreduktion 
tritt in Situationen auf, in denen Aufgaben sowohl relevante als auch irrelevante Information 
enthalten. Informationsreduktion stellt einen Strategiewechsel dar, bei dem ein Übergang von einer 
Strategie, die das Prozessieren aller Elemente einer Aufgabe beinhaltet, hin zu einer Strategie, bei 
der nur die relevanten Elemente prozessiert werden, stattfindet. Einerseits wurde in vielen 
Kontexten (z.B. Psychologie der Mensch-Maschine Interaktion, Pädagogische-, und Sport-
Psychologie) beobachtet, dass Menschen dazu neigen, irrelevante Information nach mehrfacher 
Darbietung zu ignorieren. Andererseits ist sowohl hinsichtlich der theoretischen 
Auseinandersetzung mit Strategiewechsel im kognitiven Fertigkeitserwerb, als auch aus praktischer 
Sicht nicht genügend geklärt, wie Informationsreduktion stattfindet und welche Faktoren fördernd 
bzw. hemmend wirken. In der hier zusammengefassten Forschung, hatten Probandinnen und 
Probanden die Aufgabe zu prüfen, ob alphanumerische Zeichenketten dem Alphabet folgen oder 
nicht. Die Zeichenketten bestanden aus zwei Teilen. Einer der beiden Teile war immer korrekt und 
daher letztlich irrelevant. Da verschiedene Zeichenketten  unterschiedlich oft pro Übungsblock 
präsentiert wurden, konnte ermittelt werden, ob Informationsreduktion Item-spezifisch oder Item-
generell stattfindet. Die Frage ist also, ob die Versuchspersonen den irrelevanten Teil für jede 
Zeichenkette einzeln zu ignorieren lernen, oder aber die Fertigkeit zum Ignorieren des irrelevanten 
Teiles auf einmal für alle Zeichenketten erwerben. Letzteres traf zu, Informationsreduktion fand 
Item-generell statt. Die Befunde sind inkonsistent mit der Annahme dass Strategiewechsel im 
Allgemeinen und Informationsreduktion im Besonderen, ausschließlich durch Item-spezifische, 
datengetriebene Lernprozesse erklärbar sind und willkürliche Entscheidungen beim 
Strategiewechsel folglich keine Rolle spielen. Statt dessen deuten die Daten (Reaktionszeiten, 
Fixationen, Transfer-Fehler) darauf hin, dass Strategiewechsel top-down moduliert sind. 
Schlagwörter: Informationsreduktion, Fertigkeitserwerb, Strategiewechsel, Willentliche Kontrolle
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5Introduction
Theories of skill acquisition suggest different mechanisms to account for the effects of 
practice on task performance. This dissertation will focus on accounts that root gains in 
performance in qualitative changes in the effective task structure which have been referred to as 
strategy changes (e.g., Cheng, 1985; Logan, 1988, 1992; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Siegler & Stern, 
1998). For example, Cheng (1985) linked improvements in task performance to ‘‘a restructuring of 
the task components so that they are coordinated, integrated, or reorganized into new perceptual, 
cognitive, or motor units.’’ According to this account, people reduce the mental effort required to 
perform a task by changing from one task strategy to another one, while other sources of practice 
effects for instance, involve strengthening a given procedure (e.g., Anderson, 1982; MacKay, 1982). 
Practice-related strategy change constitutes both a hallmark of successful skill acquisition and a 
constant source of operator errors in technical systems. Often a reduction of effort based on strategy 
change is welcome, for instance, when small children switch from a cumbersome, effortful finger-
counting strategy to a less effortful and much quicker memory-retrieval strategy when they are 
adding two numbers (e.g., Siegler, 1988; or Lemaire & Reder, 1999, for selection of shortcut 
strategies in arithmetic by adults). Yet, the literature on human-machine interaction contains many 
examples of operators starting to use shortcut strategies and therefore overlooking critically 
important information (e.g., examples in operating trains and aircrafts in Dekker, 2002, or power 
plants in Reason, 1990). 
In order to help ascertain that people reduce cognitive effort quickly when warranted but 
remain vigilant when needed, researchers need to better understand how skill acquisition leads to 
the reduction of cognitive effort. In this work, we focus on a particular type of strategy optimization 
that frequently occurs as a consequence of practice in a specific type of task environment and that 
has been labeled “Information Reduction” (e.g., Haider & Frensch, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, for 
related proposals also see Anderson, Matessa, & Douglass, 1995; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Green 
& Wright, 2003; Logan & Etherton, 1994; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005). The research on Information 
Reduction emphasizes practice-related changes of which rather than how information is being 
processed. Information Reduction applies in situations in which tasks contain both relevant and 
irrelevant information, and denotes a change from a strategy that is based on exhaustive processing 
of all elements of a task to a strategy that skips the irrelevant task components. Behavior in line with 
the notion of Information Reduction has been described in educational psychology (Gaeth & 
Shanteau, 1984), sports (Helsen & Pauwels, 1993), car driving (Underwood, Crundall, & Chapman, 
2002), air traffic control (Niessen, Eyferth & Bierwagen, 1999), and in many other domains.
6In the current dissertation, I am concerned with the question if people reduce information 
processing one by one for different stimuli or, alternatively, decide once to discard certain aspects 
for all stimuli. Consider privacy issues in online shopping as an example. You might be concerned 
about your personal data being transferred to third parties for marketing purposes or even identity 
theft. Maybe you feel more secure about your privacy being protected when you shop on a familiar 
website you have trusted before than on an unfamiliar one. Would you at least glance at the link to 
the privacy policy page in the latter case? Vu et al. 2007 reported eye movement data suggesting 
that users are rather likely to skip privacy information, even though they value the issue highly in 
self-report measures. Surprisingly, there was no association between how well known the particular 
websites were to the users and whether the privacy policy link was clicked, or at least fixated. 
Suggesting item-general Information Reduction, some participants consistently ignored privacy 
information across different websites, while other participants consistently checked this information 
on all sites.
Measuring Information Reduction
Much of the existing research on Information Reduction has been conducted using the 
Alphabet Verification Task (AVT, Haider & Frensch, 1996). In this task, participants are asked to 
indicate whether or not letter strings on a computer screen follow the alphabet (Figure 1). The 
strings (e.g., G [4] L M N O P) consist of a letter-digit-letter triplet (e.g., G [4] L, while the digit 
indicates that four positions in the alphabet have to be skipped) and a varying number (0, 1, 2, 3, or 
4 ) of additional letters (e.g., M N O P). Strings contain both task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
information. The triplet part of the strings is task-relevant, whereas the additional letters are 
effectively irrelevant for the participants’ task because errors never occur in these letters. In most 
experiments on Information Reduction, participants are not informed about this characteristic of the 
task.
Using the AVT paradigm, the present work employed multiple measures of Information 
Reduction. First, Information Reduction was measured in terms of the dependency of participants’ 
RTs on string length (string length effect). At the beginning of training, valid longer letter strings 
result in longer verification times than shorter strings. As soon as participants ignore the task-
irrelevant information, however, reaction times no longer depend on the length of the strings as 
responses are based on the consideration of the string triplet alone. Second, in a transfer block after 
practice, the formerly irrelevant letters were made relevant. As violations to the alphabetical order 
now also occurred outside the letter-digit-letter triplet, the proportion of transfer errors indicated the 
extent to which the formerly irrelevant information was indeed overlooked. Furthermore, irregular 
7strings were employed throughout practice in one of the experiments, that allowed to track the time 
course of Information Reduction both based on transfer error rates (for irregular trials) and RTs (for 
regular trials). Finally, we employed eye tracking data to measure the extent to which irrelevant 
information was fixated on at the trial level. On the one hand, eye tracking data show how fixations 
on irrelevant parts of the strings change with practice. In addition, changes in the fixations prior to 
stimulus onset are of interest. While anticipatory saccades early in practice are expected to aim at 
screen locations where the irrelevant part of the string is likely to appear, later in training 
participants might direct their gaze toward the relevant part of the string instead.
Figure 1.  Schematic illustration of the Alphabet Verification Task. The “relevant last”-version was used in Gaschler, 
Marewski, and Frensch (submitted). In the other experiments the relevant letter-digit-letter triplet came first and the 
irrelevant additional letters were appended as a suffix. The assignment of left vs. right keys to indicate that a string 
followed the alphabet ( for valid strings) vs. did not follow the alphabet ( for invalid strings) was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
Theoretical Goals
The present research aims to distinguish between two broad categories of theoretical 
perspectives on strategy change. According to one view, strategy change in general, and information 
reduction in particular, is a consequence of automatic, data-driven processing. Although most of the 
theories have been developed to explain different types of strategy change (most often a change 
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8from an algorithm-based strategy to a memory-retrieval strategy), their assumptions apply to 
information reduction as well. For example, in Logan’s (1988, 1992, Logan & Etherton, 1994) 
Instance Model, a strategy change (i.e., from counting through the indicated number of letters to 
retrieving from memory the correct response for an alphanumeric stimulus) occurs when the control 
of performance is passed from algorithm-based processing to memory-based processing. In the 
Instance Model, task processing is initially controlled by an algorithm but each task plus the 
respective solution is stored separately as an instance in memory as well. Every encounter with a 
task activates the algorithm that can be used to solve the task, as well as each instance that has been 
associated with the task in the past. Key to the Instance Model is the assumption of a race between 
the algorithm and the stored instances in which the fastest process wins the race, that is, determines 
the response. Due to the obligatory accumulation of memory instances, the probability that the 
memory retrieval wins the race increases with practice resulting in a gradual transition from 
algorithm-based to memory-based processing. Thus, following the Instance Model, a strategy 
change from algorithm-based to memory-based processing occurs when the number of memory 
instances is large enough to control performance; the strategy change is thus entirely data driven (for 
similar views see, e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997, 1999; Rickard, 1997, 2004; 
Siegler, 1988). The Instance Model and related theoretical views all share the assumption that 
strategy changes during task practice are the result of automatically occurring learning mechanisms 
and do not depend on top-down modulation.
However, recent data challenge the assumption that strategy change is an inevitable 
consequence of task practice as would be implied by data-driven accounts (Haider & Frensch, 1996, 
1999b, 2002; Haider, Frensch, & Joram, 2005; Newton & Roberts, 2000; Touron & Hertzog, 2004a, 
2004b; White, Cerella, & Hoyer, 2007). Rather, this research suggests that a strategy shift is at least 
in part top-down and voluntarily controlled. For example, results of experiments with the AVT have 
shown that with practice, participants become increasingly likely to abruptly switch from a strategy 
involving processing all elements of a task to a processing-relevant-elements-only strategy (Haider 
& Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005). This involves that irrelevant parts of strings are no longer 
fixated (Haider & Frensch, 1999a). When new but structure-equivalent strings are presented after 
the shortcut strategy has been adopted, Information Reduction is  transferred to the new strings 
(Haider & Frensch, 1996, 2002). Finally, speed-accuracy instructions affect how quickly during 
practice the shortcut strategy is adopted (Haider & Frensch, 1999b) in the first place and how it is 
applied later. Changing from accuracy to speed instructions within an experiment turns on 
Information Reduction turns whereas the opposite change in instructions switches it off. Together, 
these results suggest that the strategy shift leading to Information Reduction is at least partly 
9mediated by a deliberate, top-down decision.
The two alternative theoretical interpretations of strategy change in general, and information 
reduction in particular, data driven mechanism vs. top-down mechanism, are not compatible with 
each other. However, as of yet, the available empirical evidence does not clearly favor one of the 
two accounts over the other. For example, the Instance Model of skill acquisition can offer 
alternative explanations for some of the findings that have been interpreted as evidence for a top-
down influence on Information Reduction. According to the Instance Model, for example, the string 
length effect in the AVT does not disappear with practice because irrelevant information is 
strategically discarded from processing, but rather because participants come to memorize the entire 
string in one trace together with the corresponding answer. 
Fortunately, however, the data driven vs. top-down explanations of Information Reduction 
make different predictions that can be tested empirically. Specifically, one of the empirically 
tangible differences between the two positions concerns the predicted influence of a frequency-of-
presentation manipulation (see e.g. Harris, Murphy, Rehder, 2008) on Information Reduction in the 
AVT. According to the data-driven view, Information Reduction is item-specific. That is, adopting 
the novel processing-relevant-elements-only strategy in the context of the AVT for one letter string 
does not imply adopting the same strategy at the same time for a different letter string. Rather, 
whether or not the novel strategy is adopted for a particular letter string is determined, exclusively, 
by the number of prior encounters, respectively the strength of the memory representations of the 
letter string. Consequently, letter strings that are practiced very often in a training phase are more 
likely to result in Information Reduction than are letter strings that are presented only rarely.
The top-down view of strategy change does not predict string-specific Information Reduction. 
Rather, it predicts that once a participant has decided to switch to the processing-relevant-elements-
only strategy, this strategy should be applied to all letter strings — regardless of how often they 
have been practiced before. In other words, the top-down view predicts that Information Reduction 
is item-general.
Accordingly, the present research tested whether Information Reduction is  an item-specific or 
item-general process. The latter distinction has been discussed by other researchers with respect to 
various other types of changes in performance (e.g., Allen & Brooks, 1991; Anderson, 1993; Harris 
et al., 2008; Jiang & Song, 2005; Mayr & Bryck, 2005; Logan & Stadler, 1991; Nosofsky, Clark, & 
Shin, 1989; Opfer & Siegler, 2007; Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992; 
Strayer & Kramer, 1994a; Touron, 2006; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; Wright & Whittlesea, 1997 ). 
Rather than applying a transfer phase after considerable practice, we experimentally manipulated the 
frequency with which individual letter strings in the AVT were encountered in each block. Given 
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that past research has suggested that Information Reduction is item-general after practice (Haider & 
Frensch, 1996, 2002) as it was applied to a transfer block with novel strings, we were interested in 
whether Information Reduction was item-general vs. item-specific while it developed. Presumably, 
when starting with well-known items, information reduction needs considerable practice to be 
generalized to less-known items, as well. It might take considerable training to guide fixations away 
from irrelevant aspects of tasks. For instance, Smilek, Solman, Murawski, and Carriere (2009) 
found that participants fixated on words in a Stroop task at the optimal viewing position for word 
reading, even though word reading was by instruction the very process to be avoided in this task.
We used the AVT for mainly two reasons. First, this task is derived from and is very similar to 
alphabet-arithmetic, a task that has often been used in research supporting purely data-driven 
models of strategy change (e.g., Logan, 1988, 1992; Rickard, 2004). New manipulations can 
therefore challenge these theories within their original context. Second, the AVT offers strong 
means to ensure that a frequency-of-presentation manipulation indeed successfully influences 
representation strength. Participants can switch from a strategy of counting through the letters 
indicated by the digit in the triplet to (faster) memory retrieval of the correct response. Therefore, 
frequently and infrequently presented strings can be expected to differ substantially in reaction time 
(RT), as for the latter the memory representation necessary for the alternative strategy will be 
available only later in the experiment. Depending on the theoretical view, one or two strategy 
changes of interest can take place over the course of practice in the AVT. A transition from 
processing the irrelevant letters to discarding them and / or a transition from algorithmic to memory-
based evaluation. The Instance Model (Logan, 1988, 1992) and related theoretical views would 
suggest that entire strings become memorized. Information Reduction would be a by-product of the 
automatic acquisition and use of item-specific memory traces (see above). If however Information 
Reduction is item-general, then two types of strategy change would underly the performance 
improvements in the AVT: first, a transition from the algorithmic to the memory strategy 
concerning the triplets and, second, a shift from processing to ignoring the additional letters.
Predictions of Item-specific and Item-general Perspectives 
If Information Reduction is item-general, then processing of irrelevant aspects of frequent, 
infrequent, and novel strings will be reduced at the same time and at the same rate during practice. 
This should result in a parallel reduction of the RT-based string length effect over practice blocks 
(1). The additional amount of time needed to process long and medium strings (that are longer than 
short strings solely due to additional irrelevant characters) will decrease in parallel for frequent, 
infrequent, and novel strings. In a transfer phase after practice, equal rates of errors due to 
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overlooking of violations of the alphabetical order in the no longer irrelevant part of frequent, 
infrequent, and new strings are expected (2). Also, fixations to the irrelevant parts will be reduced in 
parallel and to the same extent over blocks of practice independent of string frequency (3). Item-
general Information Reduction will take place rather abruptly and at the same point in time for all 
alphanumeric strings (4). Finally, Information Reduction will not be fine-tuned to spare specific 
strings in case some of the strings during practice consistently contain irrelevant information, while 
other strings are not consistently valid outside the triplet. Thus, depending on the amount of trials in 
practice in which Information Reduction leads to an error, it will either be impeded for all strings or 
will take place for all strings – in this case at the cost of an increasing error rate of trials with strings 
that are invalid outside the triplet (5).
Different predictions for Information Reduction result from data-driven, item-specific models 
of strategy change. If Information Reduction is item-specific, then processing of irrelevant aspects 
of frequent strings will be reduced faster across blocks of trials as compared to processing of 
irrelevant aspects of infrequent strings. The RT-based string length effect and fixation time to 
irrelevant letters should decline faster across blocks for the frequent as compared to the infrequent 
strings. Accordingly, transfer error rates should be higher for frequent as compared to infrequent 
and novel strings. Data-driven item-specific Information Reduction should take place gradually 
rather than abruptly. As the responses to infrequent strings will rarely be based on memory-retrieval, 
algorithmic processing might in most cases avoid that invalid letters outside the triplet are 
overlooked if they occur in infrequently presented strings.
Results
Manipulation check – Representation strength was successfully varied
Before turning to the results on Information Reduction, it has to be emphasized that our 
manipulation checks indicated that representation strength of the strings was successfully varied in 
all experiments. In terms of RTs, frequently encountered strings were generally processed faster as 
compared to the infrequent or singleton strings. The relevant parts of infrequent and singleton 
strings accumulated longer fixation times and resulted in larger pupil dilation as compared to the 
relevant parts of frequently encountered strings.
Reduction of the string length effect over blocks (1)
Extent and time course of Information Reduction were first compared for a control group that 
practiced every alphanumeric string twice per block and an experimental group in which item 
frequency was varied within-persons (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007, Experiment 1). In the latter group, 
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half of the strings were presented once per block (infrequent strings) and the other half of the 
materials was presented three times per block (frequent strings); the overall amount of practice (i.e., 
number of trials) was identical for the two groups. Unannounced to the participants, the letters 
outside the letter-digit-letter triplet always followed the alphabetical order and were therefore 
effectively irrelevant. At the beginning of practice, longer strings (containing more irrelevant letters) 
yielded longer RTs as compared to shorter strings, indicating that irrelevant information was 
processed at the beginning. The RT-advantage of shorter over longer strings disappeared with 
practice. Importantly, Information Reduction happened at the same time and to the same extent for 
the strings presented once, twice, and three times per block, suggesting that Information Reduction 
was item-general.  
The other experiments included in the present dissertation replicated and extended the above 
finding of  equal reduction of the string length effect for strings of different frequencies of 
presentation over practice blocks. For instance, Experiment 2 in Gaschler and Frensch (2007) added 
singleton strings (each just presented in two consecutive blocks) to the frequent and infrequent 
strings. Nevertheless, the string length effect decreased in parallel over blocks for the frequency 
classes. In the last practice block, the RTs for short, medium, and long strings essentially did not 
differ from each other. Thus, the additional irrelevant letters in the medium and long strings did not 
draw additional processing time.
While usually participants are not informed about the underlying task regularities, Gaschler 
and Frensch (2009, Experiment 1) told participants upfront that the letters outside the triplets would 
be consistently valid and thus irrelevant for some of the strings. Actually, during practice all strings 
were alphabetically valid outside the triplet. One might expect the explicit instructions to lead to 
item-specific Information Reduction at least early in practice. Participants might show Information 
Reduction on the frequently repeated strings at the beginning of the Experiment as for those strings 
it should become clear early on that the letters outside the triplet are consistently valid. For the 
infrequent strings, however, Information Reduction might start in later blocks or not at all. While 
for instance the third exposure to an infrequent strings happened in Block 3, each frequent string 
had already been practiced three times in Block 1. However, participants showed the same time 
course and extent of  Information Reduction for frequent and infrequent strings, again suggesting 
that Information Reduction is item-general. Furthermore, compared to Gaschler and Frensch (2007) 
where Information Reduction was incidental, the explicit instruction led to an earlier reduction of 
the string length effect. Extra time associated with the processing of the irrelevant letters was 
present in Block 1, but already absent in Block 2.
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Equal rates of transfer errors for strings of different frequencies (2)
When in a final transfer block, the formerly irrelevant letters outside the triplet contained 
violations of the alphabetical order, high rates of transfer errors were observed. For instance, 
confirming the impression that Information Reduction was effective to a high extent, 40 out of 60 
participants in Gaschler and Frensch (2007; Experiment 2) failed to correctly verify all or all but one 
of the irregular strings in the final transfer block. Importantly, the rate of transfer errors did not 
differ for strings that had been repeated with different frequency during the practice phase. This was 
true also when an experimental manipulation of the validity of the letters outside the triplet led to a 
reduction in the overall rate of transfer errors (Gaschler & Frensch, 2009, Experiment 2). Therefore, 
the equal rates of transfer errors in Gaschler and Frensch (2007, Experiment 2, as well as in 2009, 
Experiment 1) are unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect.
Equal fixations to the irrelevant letters for strings with different frequencies (3)
Eye tracking data were employed to measure Information Reduction at the level of single 
trials in Gaschler, Marewski, and Frensch (submitted). We employed a frequency manipulation like 
in Gaschler and Frensch (2007, Experiment 2) involving frequent, infrequent, and singleton strings 
and changed the layout of the strings such that the irrelevant letters came first and were followed by 
the triplet. While in the string layout used in Gaschler and Frensch (2007, 2009), Information 
Reduction meant that the relevant triplet was likely to be fixated first and processing was stopped 
after this, the present setup tested whether Information Reduction would result in  fixations being 
directed at the relevant part of the strings from the very start of the trials (instead of just avoiding 
further fixations at the end of processing in a trial). 
This was indeed the case as with practice, participants showed the same reduction of fixation 
time on the irrelevant part of the frequent, infrequent, singleton strings. Furthermore, we observed a 
practice-related change in fixations prior to stimulus-onset, which per se has to be regarded as item-
general. In later blocks, anticipatory saccades were increasingly often directed toward where the 
relevant part of the strings was likely to appear (instead of where the string was likely to start). 
Those anticipatory saccades toward the right part of the screen were not corrected when infrequent 
or singleton strings appeared. Even when the triplet of a novel string was fixated at the onset of a 
trial, there was no re-checking of the irrelevant additional letters. The fixations on the irrelevant part 
of frequent, infrequent, and singleton strings disappeared at the same time in practice. 
In an additional step, we employed mathematical modelling to analyze and interpret the data. 
Practice-related strategy change has often been described by continuous practice functions that 
involve a “trial” parameter (e.g., power law of practice in Logan, 1988, 1992). While referring to it 
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as “trial”, the Instance Model and related data-driven, item-specific accounts of strategy change 
imply that the trial parameter in essence mirrors the number of prior encounters with the specific 
item present in the current trial, rather than how many trials have passed so far in the experiment 
(irrespective of the specific stimuli involved). As past research on strategy change in skill 
acquisition usually did not vary the frequency with which different items were presented per block, 
the number of prior encounters with a specific string and the number of prior encounters with any 
string was not dissociated experimentally as it was in our design (compare e.g., Lee & Anderson, 
2001, who proposed a power law decrease in fixation time to irrelevant screen locations).
Bolstering the above results by mathematical modeling, we used the trial by trial measure of 
fixation time in the irrelevant letters, combined with a manipulation of frequency of presentation to 
specify what the “trial” parameter meant in Information Reduction. In a first step, we compared fits 
of two versions of the power function that differed by the specific constitution of the trial parameter 
(see above). As the strategy change toward skipping the irrelevant letters was item-general, it was 
the number of prior encounters with any string rather the number of prior encounters with the 
specific string shown in the present trial that drove Information Reduction.
Time course – abruptly and at the same point in time for all strings (4)
 In a second step of mathematical modeling in Gaschler, Frensch, and Marewski (submitted), 
we tested whether the reduction of fixations on irrelevant aspects of the task does indeed follow a 
continuous practice function (specifically the power law, as e.g. suggested by Lee & Anderson, 
2001) or a discontinuous practice function. The latter possibility was put forward by research on 
Information Reduction that observed drops in RT of over 1,000 ms from one block to the next 
(Haider & Frensch, 2002; Haider et al., 2005). We found, indeed, that participants stopped to fixate 
the irrelevant letters abruptly and consistently for the different strings that occurred in the task. For 
most participants, fixations on the irrelevant letters of frequent, infrequent, and singleton strings 
stopped at approximately the same trial.
Item-general Information Reduction at the cost of errors (5)
It might be surprising that the irrelevant parts of infrequent and singleton strings were ignored 
to the same extent as were the irrelevant parts of frequent strings. In all experiments, our 
manipulation checks indicated that we had successfully varied the representation strengths of the 
strings. Yet, there was no modulation of the string length effect by frequency. The additional 
processing time that medium and long strings took as compared to short strings was identical for 
strings of different frequencies and showed the same dynamics and amounts of reduction with 
practice.
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Although these results should be surprising from data-driven perspective on skill acquisition, 
one may object that item-general Information Reduction came at no cost in the above research (i.e., 
the letters outside the triplet were consistently irrelevant during practice). This was changed in 
Gaschler and Frensch (2009, Experiment 2) as we focused on how Information Reduction could be 
avoided. Costs of item-general information reduction were imposed by occasionally placing errors 
in the letters outside the triplet. Again, half of the strings were repeated three times per block and 
the other half once per block. For one group of participants, a sixth of the trials with frequent  
strings were presented with a violation of the alphabetical order outside the triplet while such 
irregular strings never in practice occurred in the set of infrequent strings. For the other group of 
participants, the placement of violations to the alphabetical order outside the triplets was reversed. It 
affected a sixth of the trials with infrequently repeated strings, while all the frequently repeated 
strings were regular. While the proportion of irregular copies of original strings was constant 
between the experimental groups, the absolute number of irregular strings amounted to 16 vs. 48 of 
384 trials in the practice phase.  
Information Reduction was impeded in the condition with the irregular strings in the 
frequently repeated set. This condition showed few errors on the irregular trials. In the condition 
with the irregular infrequent strings, however, Information Reduction took place at the cost of an 
increase in the rate of errors in irregular strings over blocks. Differing between groups, the number 
of trials with irregular strings was the variable that affected whether or not Information Reduction 
occurred. However, within experimental groups there was no difference in Information Reduction 
for frequently vs. infrequently repeated strings. This was evident as the rate of errors on irregular 
trials in the transfer phase did not differ for frequent vs. infrequent strings within experimental 
groups. In the transfer phase, irregular strings occurred both in the set that during the the practice 
trials contained vs. was free from irregular strings. Thus, it was not the case that participants 
showed Information Reduction on the strings that were consistently valid outside the triplet while 
they avoided strategy change in case of those strings that in some trials were irregular. Information 
Reduction was item-general despite costs in terms of errors.
The string length effect based on RTs of correctly verified valid strings confirmed the above 
conclusion. The string length effect differed between experimental groups but did not differ within 
experimental groups for strings of different frequencies. The string length effect decreased with 
practice in the condition with irregular trials in the infrequent set (in parallel for valid frequent and 
infrequent strings). However, it remained constant in the experimental group with the higher 
amount of trials showing an irregular string. 
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Summary and Discussion
Conclusions based on work in the included publications 
While it has been long acknowledged that people tend to ignore information they deem 
irrelevant, the experiments in the summarized publications add to the efforts of the literature on 
Information Reduction to specify how people people discard information from processing. This 
knowledge is important on practical grounds as it, on the one hand, suggests how to secure that 
people reduce cognitive effort to use their resources efficiently when warranted and, on the other 
hand, predicts how Information Reduction can be impeded when information that is often irrelevant 
is occasionally of vital importance. On theoretical grounds, the data help to differentiate between 
two classes of theoretical views on strategy change in general and Information Reduction 
specifically. The results are inconsistent with models that base strategy change exclusively on data-
driven processing for they regard the mandatory strengthening or accumulation of memory traces as 
the sole driving force of strategy change (e.g., Logan, 1988, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; 
Palmeri, 1997, 1999; Rickard, 1997, 2004; Siegler, 1988). Rather, our data suggests the 
involvement of top-down voluntary decisions in strategy change (see also Haider & Frensch, 1996, 
1999b, 2002; Haider et al., 2005; Newton & Roberts, 2000; Touron & Hertzog, 2004a, 2004b; 
White, Cerella, & Hoyer, 2007).
Discarding of irrelevant information sets in abruptly with equal strength and consistency for 
all structure-equivalent items (i.e., alphanumeric strings) in a task – irrespective of whether the 
strings have been practiced often or rarely or are even novel. It is not the case that the novel strategy 
to discard the irrelevant letters from processing first has to be practiced with the set of material it 
has evolved on before a transfer to novel material is possible. The results suggest that Information 
Reduction is item-general as it develops in practice and thereby extend research that used transfer 
blocks with novel strings at the end of training (Haider & Frensch, 1996; 2002; see Logan & Klapp, 
1991, for a different type of strategy change). 
It is important to stress, that indicators derived from RT, fixation, pupil dilation and post 
experimental rating scales1 all showed that we successfully manipulated the representation strengths 
of the strings (or at least of their relevant parts as the results on Information Reduction suggest). 
People processed the relevant parts of the alphanumeric strings differently depending on the 
frequency of presentation per practice block. As strings with different rates of presentation were 
randomly intermixed within the blocks, so were presumably trials that were solved algorithmically 
by counting through the indicated number of letters in the triplet and trials in which memory-
1 Post-experimental ratings on string frequency were collected in an unpublished study of 35 participants 
that mirrored the design of Gaschler, Marewski, & Frensch (submitted), but lacked eye-tracking. 
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retrieval indicated the correct answer (compare e.g., Logan & Klapp, 1991; Rickard, 2004). 
Assuming that the strategy that was applied to the relevant part of the strings (i.e., algorithm vs. 
memory retrieval) varied from trial to trial, in principle, there thus should have been a basis to vary 
Information Reduction trial by trial. Also, the literature on the item-specific proportion congruent 
effect in the Stroop task suggests that people can pick up item-specific contingencies between 
relevant and irrelevant information (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008).
 Mirroring earlier reports of rather inflexible top-down driven strategy control by Strayer and 
Kramer (1994b), we found that people showed item-general Information Reduction even at the cost 
of errors when these would have been avoided by item-specific strategy selection. When 
participants were presented with one set of strings for which Information Reduction was permissible 
and another set for which it was not warranted, people exhibited Information Reduction on all 
strings, when this general strategy resulted in few errors. However, there was no Information 
Reduction at all when ignoring the additional letters would have led to more frequent error 
feedback. Presumably, there are substantial costs of switching the processing mode from trial to trial 
(e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000;  Meiran, 1996) leading to a voluntary decision to use either the 
strategy involving complete processing or the  processing-relevant-elements-only strategy for all 
strings.
Broadening the Perspective on Strategy Change
Item-general learning of the triplets
Based on the above considerations, a re-analysis of RTs for trials in which only relevant 
information was presented (short strings, triplet only) seemed warranted to explore the source of 
practice gains for the relevant part of the strings. In order to better understand the context in which 
item-general information reduction works on the irrelevant string parts, we were interested in the 
skill acquisition processes affecting the triplets. Data from 151 participants who practiced half of 
the strings three times per block and the rest of the material once per block was re-analyzed for this 
purpose (Gaschler & Frensch, 2007, Experiments 1 & 2, Gaschler & Frensch, 2009, Experiment 2). 
The main effect of frequency on RT reported in all Experiments (i.e., our manipulation check of that 
representation strength was successfully varied) suggested that processing of the triplets was 
affected by the amount of practice with the particular letter-digit-letter triplets per block. While 
processing-changes concerning the irrelevant string parts were exclusively accounted for by item-
general practice effects, this was apparently not the case for the processing of the triplet part. 
Frequent triplets were processed faster in comparison to infrequent triplets.   
Data-driven, item-specific theories of skill acquisition predict that the efficiency in processing 
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a specific triplet depends on how often it has been encountered before. For example, in Instance 
Theory (Logan, 1988, 1992), the likelihood that an answer can be retrieved from memory and does 
not have to be produced algorithmically (e.g., by counting) depends on how often the specific 
problem (i.e., alphanumeric string) has been responded to before. This suggests to plot the RT data 
of the triplets grouped by indexing the encounters with the particular strings (instead of a block-wise 
analysis as was presented in the included publications). As frequent strings had been repeated three 
times per block and infrequent ones once per block, the first four data points of the infrequent 
strings correspond to Blocks 1 to 4 respectively, while the first four encounters with frequent strings 
happened in Blocks 1 and 2.
As Figure 2 shows, RTs were reduced faster across the four encounters with infrequent as 
compared to the first four encounters with frequent strings. The infrequent strings apparently 
profited from item-general practice in the many other trials in between. In an ANOVA incorporating 
the first four encounters of the infrequent and frequent strings, this pattern led to an interaction 
between frequency and encounter [F (3, 450) = 12.59, MSE = 701451, p < .001]. Furthermore, main 
effects of frequency [F (1, 150) = 47.86, MSE = 1756436, p < .001] and encounter [F (3, 450) = 
160.94, MSE = 1157937, p < .001] reflected the fact that infrequent strings were overall processed 
faster in the first four encounters than frequent ones and that RTs declined with the number of 
encounters. Thus, item-specific practice alone could not account for the triplet processing, either. 
Rather, a mixture of item-specific and item-general processing must be assumed. The possibility 
that participants might start to develop mnemonics and actively encode items was already 
acknowledged by Logan and Klapp (1991, in their case with respect to alphabet-arithmetic; see for 
example also Sahakyan, Delaney, Kelley, 2004; Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2008) 
and is in line with post-experimental interviews collected for the research presented here. 
Participants might have produced the correct response algorithmically and then have actively 
encoded the string together with the response for later memory retrieval. Different participants 
reported to have started to encode the triplets at different points in practice (e.g., in different blocks) 
rather than from the very start of the experiment. For instance, they mentioned that they were first 
waiting to see whether the pool of the alphanumeric strings would stay the same, before starting to 
memorize. While the first few encounters with the frequently presented strings would likely already 
have occurred for most participants (e.g., the first three encounters in Block 1) when active 
encoding started, most of the encounters with the infrequent strings were yet to come. This offers an 
explanation for the higher decline in RT per encounter found for the infrequent as compared to the 
frequent strings. Presumably, the former differentially profited from active encoding.
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Figure 2.  Reanalysis of RTs to trials with short strings (relevant part only, means of individual medians) of 151 
participants. Instead of an analysis based on practice block, the data are re-arranged by indexing the encounter of the 
strings on the x-axis (compare e.g., Mayr & Bryck, 2005, Experiment 4). While the first three encounters with each of 
the frequent strings took place in Block 1, the first three encounters with the infrequent strings happened in Blocks 1, 2, 
and 3. Purely item-specific, data-driven learning would predict a complete overlap of the two practice curves. The error 
bar represents the within-subjects standard error of the mean based on the interaction of frequency and encounter 
(Masson & Loftus, 2003). The lines with the filled symbols depict the non-parametric relative learning rate (RLR) based 
on the RT at Encounter 12 as an estimate of the asymptote. Simulations have suggested that RLRs of the first half of the 
practice curve are relatively robust for overestimations of the true asymptote.   
The practice curve of the 12 encounters with the frequently repeated items offers yet another 
interesting observation. Data-driven theories of  skill acquisition would assume that the largest gains 
in performance happen early in practice. Logan (1988, 1992), for instance, proposed that RTs 
should follow a power function. Descriptively, such a function would be characterized by a 
decreasing relative learning rate. The early encounters with the material led to the acquisition of a 
higher proportion of what has yet to be learned (till asymptotic performance) as compared to later 
encounters (compare Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2000). Such a decrease in relative learning 
rate is however, not observed in the present data (compare2 and Figure 2). Presumably, many 
2 Note that unpublished data suggest that the performance at the 12th encounter is close to the asymptote. 





























participants did not start active encoding early in practice. If it is assumed that the strategy change 
from algorithmic solution to responding based on memory-retrieval was distributed over the entire 
practice phase across the participants, then a major contribution to overall performance would have 
worked against the power law. In line with this assumption, the result at the aggregate level shows a 
much shallower curvature than would be expected by a power function (compare Haider & Frensch, 
2002 for how the distribution of abrupt changes relates to the curve describing aggregated 
performance).   
Taken together, the results on triplet processing suggest that not only Information Reduction 
concerning the suffixes, but even the transition from an algorithmic to a retrieval-based strategy 
concerning the triplets is subject to an item-general top-down strategy selection.
Data-driven and yet item-general?
A brief discussion of alternative interpretations of the above evidence seems warranted. Are 
there purely data-driven accounts that could explain item-general Information Reduction? One 
option would be to argue that allocation of attention to screen positions is learned. According to this 
view, Information Reduction would be item-general because shifts of attention or eye movements to 
screen positions are learned and this knowledge would be item-general (i.e., shifts to specific 
locations rather than to specific characters). For instance, in the model by Kruschke (2001, 2003; 
see also Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005, for a model test including eye tracking data), a 
learning mechanism changing feature-response associations is working together with a learning 
mechanism that alters the attentional weights of features quickly, thereby shutting on and off the 
impact of certain feature-response links depending on their success in predicting rewarded 
categorizations. By this account, the screen positions carrying the relevant part of the alphanumeric 
strings would with practice receive more attention and the irrelevant letters would receive less. 
Consequently, task-relevant information (the triplet) would be in the focus of attention and 
infrequent or even novel information outside the focus would have the role of an unattended, task-
irrelevant distractor and therefore would not influence performance (compare e.g., Gronau, 
Sequerra, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2006).  
It is unlikely that the above considerations could give a full account of the data on Information 
Reduction that are presented in this dissertation. Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) used eye-tracking in 
a classification task in which the features differed in relevance and were spatially separated. They 
found that for many participants, classification errors and fixations to screen positions carrying the 
very beginning of the experiment. However, the speedup from the 1st to the 2nd encounter with the novel triplets 
showed larger gains as compared to the 1st and 2nd encounters at the beginning of the experiment. Supposedly, many 
participants employed active encoding when they see the novel strings for the first time at the end of the experiment, 
while this approach was not yet in effect in the first block for many participants. 
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unpredictive features ended abruptly. Consistent with the view that eye-movements were following 
rather than driving the change in the classification process (i.e., discovery of a rule), the 
classification errors ended just before the fixations on the unpredictive features ceased. 
Furthermore, manipulating the predictive value of spatial positions, Haider and Frensch (1999a) 
documented Information Reduction in a condition in which the position of relevant triplet was 
varied on a trial-to-trial basis. Yet, Information Reduction was somewhat slower when the triplet 
was placed first or last in the strings, varying randomly from trial to trial, as compared to conditions 
that kept the position of the relevant information constant within participants. In the eye tracking 
study included in the present work, we found item-general Information Reduction despite the fact 
that strings were presented centered on the screen. As a consequence, the triplets appeared in the 
middle of the screen when strings were short, but on the far right of the screen when strings were 
long. The absolute location of the relevant string part thus varied considerably from trial to trial.
Based on the above considerations, absolute screen positions therefore are not a candidate 
learning target for an item-general, data-driven learning mechanism and one could try to suggest 
data-driven models that learn relative screen positions. In a line of research that is currently 
conducted, we investigated strategy change in a situation where neither absolute nor relative screen 
positions were predictive3. In each trial, participants saw a cloud of copies of one letter that were 
randomly distributed over the screen. In a first experiment, participants responded left vs. right 
depending on whether the number of copies of the current letter was odd or even. Some letters were 
used five times per block and others just once per block. According to a hidden regularity, all trials 
with more than four letters demanded the response odd (or even, counterbalanced across 
participants). After some practice, participants stopped counting the instances of the letter in large 
clouds, as the very fact that it was a large cloud already suggested the answer. RTs and transfer 
errors showed that the strategy change was item-general. Interestingly, this was true even in a 
second experiment, in which the responses were item-specific. Rather than pressing a left vs. right 
on the keyboard for odd vs. even numbers of letters, participants responded with the regular key of 
the specific letter used in the current trial. To indicate whether the number of instances was odd or 
even this key was pressed once vs. twice (again counterbalanced). Although the strategy change 
occurred later in practice, as compared to the version with just two response buttons, it was 
nevertheless item-general, despite the item-specific mode of responding. Of course, such a 
manipulation could also be employed in the AVT to explore the boundary conditions of item-
general Information Reduction in that task.
3 If anything, the sheer amount of shifts of attention or fixations in a trial was predictive of the answer.
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Studying Information Reduction after it happened outside the lab?
In an article currently under revision, Gaschler, Mata, Störmer, Kühnel, and Bilalić explored 
whether the flicker change blindness paradigm (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997) can be employed 
to study which information people process on food packages. On each trial two versions of a 
photograph with a food product were shown in alternation, interrupted by a brief blank. The two 
versions differed by one type of product information. For instance, in a given trial the best-before 
date might have been constantly appearing and disappearing until the participant indicated the 
location of the change in the current picture with a mouse click. Of special interest were the change 
detection times for product information only recently introduced to the market (certain health 
claims, organic food label of the European Union). Interestingly, older participants (who were 
presumably more experienced consumers) showed differentially longer detection latencies on the 
newer product information while their detection latencies on established product information were 
not higher than that of younger participants. 
One interpretation of these findings is based on a view of grocery shopping from a skill 
acquisition perspective. For the older participants, proficiency in the features needed to find the 
milk and select the right sort at the supermarket might have reached asymptotic levels before the 
new product information was introduced. Given a habitual set of search-features, it might therefore 
have been more difficult to attend to other product information, even in a lab task that explicitly 
demanded this.
Voluntary vs. involuntary performance changes
The above interpretation suggests that voluntary control of features to-be-attended to might be 
rather limited once practice in selecting one set of features has occurred. In a similar vein, the 
literature on the set effect suggests that known solutions to problems can block the discovery of 
better ones. Testing proficient chess players, Bilalić, McLeod, and Gobet (2008a) showed that 
problem solving ability was reduced to that of players three standard deviations lower in skill level 
by the presence of the non-optimal solution. The standard solution to a chess problem (that was 
most likely voluntarily acquired earlier in the carrier of the players), prevented the participants from 
finding a better solution. Even though the players knew that they were to search for a solution other 
than the standard approach they spotted right away, they could not direct their fixations away from 
the fields on the board associated with this standard solution (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008b). 
The best solution was, however, quickly discovered if the standard approach was rendered 
unsuitable (by placing a bishop in such a position that the first move of the standard solution was 
impossible). 
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While there is good evidence that Information Reduction is under voluntary control when it 
takes place, other forms of change in task performance change have been documented that most 
likely are purely data-driven and lack voluntary control. Implicit sequence learning might be 
considered as one example. At the beginning of an implicit sequence learning experiment, 
participants respond mainly stimulus-driven as in any choice-reaction experiment, while later on, 
response control shifts from the stimuli to the memory representation acquired due to the 
predictable sequence (compare Tubau, Hommel, & López-Moliner, 2007). Often, an abrupt and 
large performance gain is observed which can be linked to participants becoming able to verbalize 
the sequence and use explicit sequence knowledge to speed up responding (Frensch & Rünger, 
2003; Rünger & Frensch, 2008). However, gradual and involuntary shifts in control of performance 
seem to take place as well. For instance, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001) showed that 
participants fail to follow an instruction that asks them to produce any sequence but the one they 
were previously exposed to. Thus, even though control of responding has shifted from the stimuli to 
the sequence knowledge, voluntary control is lacking. In a similar vein, Perlman and Tzelgov 
(2006) demonstrated acquisition and transfer of sequence knowledge that was neither required nor 
beneficial for task performance. 
In sequence learning tasks, there is usually a one-to-one correspondence between one 
sequence of stimuli and one sequence of responses (but see Goschke & Bolte, 2007). Accordingly, it 
can be argued that shifts in control are rooted in the strengthening of encounter-specific (i.e., 
stimulus-specific and / or response-specific) knowledge rather than in the acquisition of processing 
strategies applicable to many stimuli (compare Doane, Sohn, & Schreiber, 1999) and therefore do 
not constitute examples of strategy change per se. Therefore, it is important to note that strategy 
change outside voluntary control has also been documented in tasks other than the AVT, that 
dissociated learning effects involving the specific material and learning effects involving processing 
steps. Examples involve Woltz, Gardener, and Bell (2000) who studied the acquisition and transfer 
of knowledge concerning the sequence of cognitive operations in the Number Reduction Task and 
Doane et al., 1999) who investigated the development and transfer of visual discrimination 
strategies in a polygon comparison task. 
It has yet to be established why strategy change under some conditions occurs as a top-down 
voluntary decision while under other conditions, voluntary control seems to be lacking. Presumably, 
the availability of verbal codes could be an important variable. The power of instructions to 
configure task-sets has for instance been documented by Kray, Eenshuistra, Kerstner, Weidema, and 
Hommel (2006) and by Wenke and Frensch (2005) and self-instructions likely have a similar power. 
Accordingly, spontaneously generated verbal knowledge of a task regularity might be causal in 
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producing voluntary changes in the task set. This alleged verbal-executive route of strategy change 
would be impeded when verbal descriptions are difficult to generate. For instance, participants 
might not have spontaneously generated verbal descriptions of their approaches to differentiate 
between the arbitrary polygons of Doane et al., 1999) as the stimuli were neither verbal nor easy to 
describe verbally. For situations in which verbal coding is likely, the involvement of the latter in the 
generation of top-down control might be investigated including neurophysiological data. So far, 
results point to the involvement of the medial temporal lobe in the acquisition of processing 
sequences (e.g., Rose, Haider, Weiller, & Büchel, 2002) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
in strategy change (e.g., Rose, Haider, Büchel, Verleger, 2001). Temporal lag correlations with 
activity patterns in verbal areas might help to test the link between speech and voluntary strategy 
change.
Finally, apart from being informative with respect to the choice of interventions fostering or 
impeding Information Reduction, the finding that Information Reduction is top-down modulated 
also renders important the inclusion of personality characteristics thought to influence top-down 
control in future studies. This involves the constructs of behavioral approach vs. behavioral 
inhibition (Gray, 2004; Gray & Burgess, 2004), promotion vs. prevention focus (Förster, Higgins, 
Bianco, 2003; Higgins, 2000) and need for cognition (Caccioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).
Conclusion
In showing that Information Reduction develops item-generally, the work collected in this 
dissertation delivers further empirical arguments countering models that root strategy change in 
cognitive skill acquisition exclusively in data-driven, item-specific learning. Rather, the results 
speak for the involvement of top-down voluntary control in strategy change. Participants decide to 
ignore parts of tasks they deem irrelevant and adhere to this approach when confronted with less 
well known or even novel material. Future work might try to explain why some forms of strategy 
change are apparently under voluntary control while others are not. 
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